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Notes 
LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF 
URINALYSIS:  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
RANDOM SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING 
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism.  School officials do not possess absolute 
authority over their students.  Students in school as well as 
out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution.  They are 
possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, 
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the 
State.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As freshman Guy Good sits in his fourth period Spanish class at 
Garrison High School on the first day of school, his nerves have settled 
and he is excited about the various opportunities his school has to offer.2  
Like many high school freshmen, he is insecure about his developing 
body and is often uncomfortable in social settings.  Unlike many of his 
peers, Guy has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder, for which he takes Ritalin on a daily basis.  Guy is frustrated 
by his disorder, but understands that he needs to take Ritalin to function 
productively and concentrate in school.  Because he is self-conscious 
about his condition, Guy and his parents decided that they would keep 
this medical information confidential. 
Ten minutes before the bell is due to ring for fifth period, the 
principal enters the class and demands that Guy follow him to his office.  
Guy is embarrassed by being singled out in front of his classmates, but 
knows that he has never caused any trouble.  Still, he breaks into a 
nervous sweat when he hears the principal announce his name in front 
of the class.   
                                                 
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
2 The school and people described in this hypothetical are fictional.  However, the 
hypothetical school policy bears a close resemblance to those challenged in Bd. of Educ. v. 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002), Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995), and 
Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 931 (N.D. Tex. 2001).  See infra Part 
II.C (discussing these cases). 
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Unbeknownst to Guy and his parents, over the summer, the school 
district implemented a random drug testing program and he is one of the 
students who has been selected.  He is led to the restroom where the 
principal hovers behind him and demands that he produce a urine 
sample for testing and disclose any medications he is currently taking.  
Guy’s face turns pale and his mouth goes dry.  With no choice, he 
produces the sample, reveals his Ritalin prescription, and leaves the 
principal’s office feeling violated.   
Following recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment’s application to public school children, random 
suspicionless drug testing, like that at Garrison High School, has become 
a reality in American schools.  This Note will address the constitutional 
boundaries of suspicionless drug testing for Guy and other students in 
public schools who may be subjected to such privacy concerns.    
In doing so, Part II will first provide background information 
describing the structure of the Fourth Amendment and how it has been 
applied to the states, particularly in the public school setting.3  Part II.B 
will then introduce the “special needs” doctrine that the Court has 
created, which has allowed the government to circumvent the warrant 
and probable cause provisions of the Fourth Amendment.4  In 
addressing how the Fourth Amendment has been applied in the school 
environment, Part II.C will generally discuss the diminished 
constitutional rights afforded to students and how these rights differ 
from those of adult citizens.5   
Next, Part III of this Note will discuss how these decisions 
establishing diminished rights have paved the way for school districts to 
implement suspicionless drug testing for all students enrolled in public 
school.6  Part III will also examine the policies that have recently been 
implemented by school districts and how the Court might apply its 
previous decisions in determining their constitutionality.7  Finally, Part 
IV will propose a new test, which factors in the rights of the students’ 
                                                 
3 See infra Part II.A. 
4 See infra Part II.B.  While the “special needs” doctrine has traditionally been applied to 
criminal contexts, this Note will discuss how the Supreme Court has recently applied it to 
non-criminal conduct, particularly in the public school setting. 
5 See infra Part II.C. 
6 See infra Part III. 
7 Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 919.  In this case, the school district’s drug testing policy 
was held to be unconstitutional after applying the balancing test that was implemented by 
the Court in Vernonia.  Id. at 930; see infra Part IV. 
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parents, for courts to apply when addressing the privacy rights of 
students in public schools.8 
II.  BACKGROUND 
To properly analyze the issue of suspicionless drug testing in public 
schools, Part II will discuss prior Supreme Court decisions that have led 
to the gradual erosion of the language of the Constitution and students’ 
constitutional rights.  Part II.A will first explore the text of the Fourth 
Amendment and its subsequent interpretation by the Court.9  Next, Part 
II.B will discuss the special needs doctrine that the Court has used to 
circumvent the language of the Fourth Amendment.10  Lastly, this Part 
will interpret how the Court has applied the special needs doctrine in 
public schools.11 
While the Supreme Court has held that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,” it has also held that 
students’ expectations of privacy are not the same as those of adults.12  In 
the face of the national “War on Drugs,” the Supreme Court held school 
policies implementing mandatory suspicionless drug testing for high 
school students to be constitutional despite the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.13 
                                                 
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 See infra Part II.A. 
10 See infra Part II.B.  The Court has applied the special needs doctrine in the school 
setting and in government employment positions where safety is of great concern.  See 
generally Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (1995); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
11 See infra Part II.B.  The Court has conclusively held that schools are to be considered 
state actors in regard to the Fourth Amendment, stating: 
If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to 
understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental 
rather than public authority when conducting searches of their 
students. 
New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985). 
12 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).  But see 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (holding that “Fourth Amendment 
rights . . . are different in public schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot 
disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children”); T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
at 340 (“The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit 
activity needed to justify a search. . . . [I]n certain limited circumstances neither [probable 
cause nor the requirement of a warrant] is required.”). 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
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In the wake of these Supreme Court decisions, school districts across 
the country have implemented drug testing policies that expand their 
reach to students who are involved in extracurricular activities or who 
drive to school, or even in some cases, to the entire student population.14  
New Jersey has implemented a state-wide policy mandating that high 
schools conduct drug testing on their students.15  In his 2004 State of the 
Union Address, President George W. Bush proposed the allocation of 
$23 million in federal funding to schools that implement drug testing 
programs for students.16  However, while a bill requesting this funding 
was proposed in the House of Representatives, it was never enacted.17  
This federal push to implement drug testing programs for all students is 
an indication of a future debate that the Supreme Court may have to 
decide:  Is suspicionless drug testing constitutional for all high school 
students when they are subjected to compulsory attendance?18  This Note 
suggests that suspicionless drug testing is a violation of both students’ 
                                                                                                             
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id.  See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (upholding a school policy expanding drug testing to 
students involved in any extracurricular activity, regardless of any previous suspicion of 
individualized use); Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646 (finding it constitutional to drug test student 
athletes after school had cited specific issues concerning increased drug use in the school); 
KRIS E. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: 1789 TO THE PRESENT 68 (Gale Group, Inc. 
2000).  In the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan established a national “War on Drugs” 
to combat increased drug use.  Douglas B. Marlow, Effective Strategies for Intervening with 
Drug Abusing Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1025 n.15 (2002).  The War on Drugs increased 
penalties for drug crimes and implemented mandatory prison sentences for various drug 
offenses.  Id. 
14 RYOKO YAMAGUCHI, LLOYD D. JOHNSTON & PATRICK M. O’MALLEY, UNIV. OF MICH., 
INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, DRUG TESTING IN SCHOOLS: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND 
ASSOCIATION WITH STUDENT DRUG USE 159 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files 
PDFs/yesoccpaper2.pdf; Drug Testing Fails Our Youth, http://drugtestingfails.org/ 
challenge.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Drug Testing Fails]. 
15 Chris Newmarker, New Jersey To Test High-School Athletes for Drugs, SEATTLE TIMES, 
May 6, 2006.  The New Jersey testing program was implemented to test for performance-
enhancing drugs in the wake of the steroid popularity among athletes.  Id.  Students, 
athletes, and their parents have to sign consent forms for the testing and a failure to do so 
will render them ineligible for athletics.  Id.  The tests screen for nearly eighty banned 
substances, ranging from steroids to amphetamines. Id. 
16 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, 2004 State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 20, 2004). 
17 Empowering Parents and Teachers for a Drug-Free Education Act of 2004, H.R. 3720, 
108th Cong. (2004). 
18 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that the majority’s opinion purposefully saved the question of mandatory 
testing for all student enrolled in public schools for another day). 
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Fourth Amendment privacy rights and their parents’ fundamental rights 
to control the upbringing of their children. 
A. The Limited Protection of the Fourth Amendment in America’s Public 
Schools  
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides for 
individuals to be secure in their person as against unreasonable search 
and seizure.19  The Fourth Amendment contains two distinct clauses that 
must be considered separately.20  The first clause states that 
unreasonable searches and seizures will be unconstitutional.21  The 
second states that specific warrants, with a showing of probable cause, 
are required before the government searches property.22  The Supreme 
Court has previously held that the warrant clause is not suited for the 
school setting, and has only considered the first “reasonableness” clause 
of the amendment in its application with respect to students.23 
                                                 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 13.  While the Fourth Amendment has generally 
been applied to criminal cases, the Court has held that it also applies to government agents, 
such as public schools and government employers.  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985).  The Court has stated 
that, “The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this 
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by 
governmental officials.”  Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).  The Fourth 
Amendment has not been interpreted by the Court to require a warrant in order for a 
search to be deemed reasonable.  JAMES L. MADDEX, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND 
COMMENTS 167 (1974).  “A search implies some exploratory investigation, or an invasion 
and quest, a looking for or seeking out.”  5 AM. JUR. Trials § 2 (1966).  A search usually 
requires a government entity to pry into hidden places beyond the ordinary senses.  Id. 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; PALMER, supra note 13, at 69.  These two clauses have been 
labeled the “reasonableness clause,” which refers to whether or not such government 
searches are reasonable, and the “warrant clause,” which requires that no warrant shall be 
issued without probable cause.  Garth Thomas, Note, Random Suspicionless Drug Testing: 
Are Students No Longer Afforded Fourth Amendment Protections?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 
451, 451 n.7 (2003). 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
22 Id.; PALMER,  supra note 13, at 68-69. 
23 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (holding that requiring a teacher obtain a warrant before 
pursuing disciplinary action would interfere with the speed and informality required to 
successfully maintain discipline in schools, writing, “we hold today that school officials 
need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority”); see 
infra Part II.C.  For protection under the Fourth Amendment, the search has to be 
performed by an “instrument or agent of the government.”  Blake W. Martell, Hitting the 
Mark: Vernonia School District v. Acton, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 223, 224 (1996).  In deciding 
whether a search is reasonable, the Court must balance the government’s need to conduct 
the search with the state’s interest.  Id. at 225. 
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The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the public school 
environment is relatively undeveloped.24 However, recent Court 
decisions have established that schools are government agencies and that 
Constitutional protections will apply to searches administered by school 
administrators.25  At the inception of the Fourth Amendment, its 
fundamental basis was the protection of property interests, but the 
Court’s jurisprudence in the last century has determined that its focus 
should be interpreted as a protection of individual privacy.26  While the 
Supreme Court now recognizes privacy as a constitutional right, it is 
unclear what level of scrutiny it will use in a constitutional right of 
privacy challenge.27   
                                                 
24 See Joanna Raby, Note, Reclaiming Our Public Schools: A Proposal for School-Wide Drug 
Testing, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 999, 1000 (1999).  Traditionally, Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has focused on searches and seizures in the criminal setting and only within 
the last fifty years has the Court considered its application in the school setting.  Id.  Prior to 
1985, the first time the Fourth Amendment was addressed in the public school context, 
school officials were not considered to be government agents with respect to Fourth 
Amendment application.  See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325; Raby, supra, at 1000.  The relationship 
between students and their teachers was analogous to that of a parent and a child.  Raby, 
supra, at 1000; see also supra note 11 
25 See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646 (1995); T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325. 
26 PALMER, supra note 13, at 69.  Palmer concluded that this shift in interpretation 
indicates that privacy has become a constitutional right.  Id.  Decisions in the last century 
have accepted privacy as a constitutional right, but have tried to define exactly what level 
of privacy individuals should enjoy.  Id. 
27 Id.  In a line of cases regarding abortion, the Court found the right of privacy to be a 
fundamental right found in the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights.  Id. at 212; see also 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  The Court has identified three levels of 
scrutiny that it will apply when a law or policy is challenged: strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, and the rational basis test.  PALMER, supra note 13, at 344.  The most rigid of these 
tests is strict scrutiny, which requires the state to provide both a compelling state interest in 
the law, and that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve that state interest.  Id.  Strict 
scrutiny is applied to rights that are enumerated in the Constitution, as well as to 
unenumerated rights that the Court has found to be fundamental rights.  Id.  Under the 
intermediate scrutiny test, the state must prove that the law must “serve an important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.” Id. at 345.  The rational basis test only requires that the legislature has a 
reasonable basis for enacting a particular statute.  Id.  As a result, most laws challenged 
under the rational basis test will be upheld.  Id.  While the  Court has recognized the right 
of privacy as a fundamental right in other contexts, it did not apply any of the three levels 
of scrutiny described when determining what students’ expectations of privacy should be.  
Id.  Instead, it focused on the “reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
which most closely resembles the intermediate scrutiny test.  Earls, 536 U.S. at 829; 
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2007], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/7
2006] Suspicionless Drug Testing in Public Schools 821 
Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court has identified situations 
where it is “reasonable” to perform the search and seizure of an 
individual in the absence of individualized suspicion.28  The Court has 
self-created these reasonableness exceptions and defined them as 
“special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”29  In these 
special needs circumstances, the Court created a balancing test that 
compares the importance of the individual’s privacy interest against the 
governmental interest of waiving the warrant and probable cause 
requirements.30 
B. The Court-created Special Needs Doctrine and the Court’s Departure from 
the Language of the Constitution 
In two cases decided on the same day, Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n31 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,32 
                                                 
28 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997).  The Fourth Amendment requires that 
searches and seizures be reasonable, and a search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in 
the absence of individualized suspicion or wrongdoing.  Id.  In the criminal context, 
individualized suspicion is a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure, but the 
special needs doctrine has allowed the government to search individuals in situations with 
no individualized suspicion of unlawful behavior.  Id. 
29 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (“Except in certain 
well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is 
accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.”). 
30 Id.  Part of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee for people to be secure in their persons 
is that the government is barred from conducting unreasonable searches without some type 
of individualized suspicion, which requires a showing of probable cause.  Chandler, 520 
U.S. at 308.  The Court’s application of the balancing test has been criticized for having a 
“thumb on the scale,” favoring the schools drug testing policy, as Irene Merker Rosenberg 
wrote: 
Engaging in a reasonableness inquiry completely divorced from the 
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 
the majority manipulated the constituent factors in the balancing test, 
easing the government’s burden of establishing appropriate ends and 
means and minimizing not just the individual privacy right but also 
the intrusion on it . . . . [I]n effect, the requirement of a governmental 
interest of sufficient magnitude, an ends inquiry, has been diluted by 
allowing the other two balancing factors to be interjected into the 
government interest analysis before any balancing takes place. . . . Yet 
the balancing test itself demands that each factor—the private interest, 
the government interest, and the nature of the intrusion—be viewed in 
isolation before the balance is made, in order to assess correctly the 
magnitude of each of these factors. 
Irene Merker Rosenberg, Public School Drug Testing: The Impact of Acton, 33 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 349, 351, 365 (1996). 
31 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.  In these cases, the Court ignored the “probable cause” 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment and developed the “special needs” doctrine to 
justify the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  The Court 
determined that there were circumstances where an individualized suspicion is not 
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the Court developed the special needs doctrine and described how it 
applies in the context of non-criminal drug testing.33  In both cases, the 
Court first established that drug testing through urinalysis is a violation 
of an individual’s privacy and constitutes a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.34  After making this determination, the Court considered 
the reasonableness of non-criminal urinalysis searches in the government 
employment context.35  In doing so, the Court weighed the privacy 
interests of the individuals against the government’s interest in public 
safety.36   
                                                                                                             
necessary when the government has special needs that outweigh the requirements of 
probable cause and individualized suspicion.  Id. at 624.  While the Court did not specify 
what level of scrutiny it would apply, it stated that a search may be reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment if the privacy interests involved are minimal and where there is an 
important governmental interest.  Id.  Although this seems similar to intermediate scrutiny, 
the Court also concluded that the state had a compelling interest in drug testing its 
employees, and thus this program would have passed strict scrutiny.  Id. at 633. 
32 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
33 Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656. 
34 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. 
We have long recognized that a “compelled intrusio[n] into the body 
for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content”  must be deemed a 
Fourth Amendment search. . . . The ensuing chemical analysis of the 
sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested 
employee’s privacy interests. . . . [C]hemical analysis of urine, like that 
of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, 
including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.  Nor can 
it be disputed that the process of collecting the sample to be tested, 
which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act 
of urination, itself implicates privacy interests. . . . Because it is clear 
that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of 
privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal 
Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that 
these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Id. at 616-17. 
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than 
the passing of urine.  Most people describe it by euphemisms if they 
talk about it at all.  It is a function traditionally performed without 
public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally 
prohibited by law as well as social custom. 
Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 175. 
35 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-19. 
36 Id. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677.  These cases both involved government 
employees—railroad employees and customs agents.  The Court in both cases held that 
their expectation of privacy was diminished due to their occupations.  In Von Raab, the 
Court opined: 
We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the 
interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in 
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1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n:  The Introduction of the 
Special Needs Doctrine and the Start Down the Slippery Slope 
In Skinner, the Court considered a drug testing program 
implemented by the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) that 
required blood testing and urinalysis of employees who were involved 
in train accidents or violated certain safety rules.37  While there was 
evidence of a substantial drug and alcohol abuse problem with railroad 
employees in general, there was no individual suspicion, which the 
Court had previously required before subjecting an employee to a drug 
test.38   
To determine what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court administered a balancing test, weighing the governmental interest 
in requiring drug testing against the individual’s right to privacy.39  The 
Court determined that the governmental interest and special needs 
outweighed the individual’s right to privacy and that the drug testing in 
this situation was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.40  The Court 
also reasoned that individualized suspicion was not required to make 
these searches constitutional; the overarching problem of the employees 
                                                                                                             
the line of duty likewise have a diminished expectation of privacy in 
respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test.  Unlike most 
private citizens or government employees in general, employees 
involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect effective 
inquiry into their fitness and probity. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672. 
37 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.  After evidence showed that drug and alcohol abuse had led 
to a significant number of train accidents, the FRA adopted safety standards for the 
railroad industry.  Id.  These standards included breath and urine tests to employees in 
violation of safety rules.  Id.  The Court cited a drug abuse problem affecting the railroad 
for over a century, and at trial, the FRA exhibited substantial evidence indicating that the 
use of alcohol and drugs on the job was a significant concern in the industry.  Id. 
38 Id. at 606.  “When the balance of interests precludes insistence on a showing of 
probable cause, we have usually required ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion’ 
before concluding that a search is reasonable.”  Id. at 624. 
39 Id. at 618.  The Court stated: 
What is reasonable . . . “depends on all of the circumstances 
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or 
seizure itself.”  Thus, the permissibility of a particular practice “is 
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.” 
Id. at 619 (citations omitted). 
40 Id. at 633. 
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in general was sufficient evidence to satisfy the “reasonableness” 
requirement.41   
But in his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall criticized the majority 
as being “shortsighted” in sacrificing “fundamental freedoms” in light of 
the national war on drugs, which he described as a “momentary 
emergenc[y].”42  Marshall was concerned with the majority’s willingness 
to stray from the language of the Constitution in favor of a pressing 
public concern.43  The Court’s eagerness to stray from the Constitutional 
language was again put to the test when it was faced with National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, a case with similar facts to Skinner, 
but without a reasonable suspicion of employee drug use.44 
2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab:  Slipping Further, the 
Court Finds Drug Testing Constitutional Without a Showing of 
Reasonable Suspicion 
The Court in Von Raab decided the constitutionality of a urinalysis 
drug testing program designed to test members of the United States 
                                                 
41 Id.  The Court concluded that the usual requirement of individualized suspicion 
would hinder the Railroad’s regulation program.  Id.  Later, the dissent in Vernonia v. Acton 
questioned that finding, stating: 
One searches today’s majority opinion in vain for recognition that 
history and precedent establish that individualized suspicion is 
“usually required” under the Fourth Amendment (regardless of 
whether a warrant and probable cause are also required) and that, in 
the area of intrusive personal searches, the only recognized exception 
is for situations in which a suspicion-based scheme would be likely 
ineffectual. 
515 U.S. 646, 676 (1995) (O’Connor, J. dissenting).  The Court referred to the holding in 
Skinner, where a suspicionless test was first upheld, stating that, “it could be plausibly 
argued that the fact that testing occurred only after train operators were involved in serious 
train accidents amounted to an individualized suspicion requirement in all but name, in 
light of the record evidence of a strong link between serious train accidents and drug and 
alcohol use.”  Id. at 675. 
42 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  “Precisely because the need for 
action against the drug scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional 
excess is great.”  Id. 
43 Id. at 655. 
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law.  For great cases are called 
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the 
future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming 
interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment.  These 
immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes 
what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well 
settled principles of law will bend. 
Id. at 654 (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes). 
44 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
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Customs Service (“Service”) when they applied for transfers or 
promotions.45  Unlike the testing program in Skinner, the Service had not 
indicated a specific drug problem among its employees and it also 
conceded that the program had not been successful in discovering 
users.46  Additionally, Service employees, unlike most citizens, have a 
diminished expectation of privacy and bodily intrusions.47  
Despite a lack of individualized suspicion, or even a specific drug 
problem with the employees in general, the Court held that the 
governmental interest in administering drug tests on Service employees 
outweighed their privacy expectations.48  The Court also stated that the 
drug testing program substantially related to the Service’s goal of 
deterring suspect employees from obtaining highly sensitive positions.49 
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in the Von Raab holding for 
the same reasons stated in Skinner.50  However, Justices Scalia and 
Stevens came on board in the Von Raab dissenting opinion and 
distinguished Von Raab from Skinner, arguing that there was no 
                                                 
45 Id. at 660.  These tests were required of employees seeking three areas of employment: 
“drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws,” carrying firearms, and the handling of 
classified material.  Id. at 660-61. The laboratory specifically tested for marijuana, cocaine, 
opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine.  Id. at 662.  Employees who test positive are 
subject to dismissal from the Service.  Id. at 663. 
46 Id. at 673.  “[N]o more than 5 employees out of 3,600 have tested positive for drugs.”  
Id. 
47 Id. at 672.  The Court reasoned that Service employees have a diminished expectation 
of privacy compared to the average citizen because “successful performance of their duties 
depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity,” and they should not be able to keep 
information from their employers that bears directly on their fitness.  Id.  As a result, their 
privacy interest did not outweigh the government’s compelling interest in the safety and 
security of protecting our national borders.  Id. 
48 Id. at 677.  These tests were upheld as they pertained to employees involved in drug 
interdiction and carrying firearms, but the testing pertaining to the handling of classified 
material was remanded because the Court felt that it was too ambiguous to uphold.  Id.  
The government interest in this case involved ensuring that the front-line personnel were 
both physically fit and had “unimpeachable integrity and judgment” when evaluating 
those who cross the national borders.  Id. at 670. 
49 Id. at 676.  The Court noted that Service employees often are exposed to criminal 
activities in the smuggling of drugs across the nation’s borders.  Id. at 669.  They are also 
tempted by bribes and have been highly involved with dangerous and illegal activity due 
to the high sensitivity of their position.  Id.  “The public interest likewise demands effective 
measures to prevent the promotion of drug users to positions that require the incumbent to 
carry a firearm, even if the incumbent is not engaged directly in the interdiction of drugs.”  
Id. at 670. 
50 Id. at 680. (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for 
sacrificing fundamental freedoms in light of a temporary war on drugs.  Id. at 686-87; see 
supra note 44. 
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connection between the frequency of the use and the harm demonstrated 
by the Service, which was an essential factor in the Skinner decision.51  
Because there was no showing of an actual problem in the field, Justices 
Stevens and Scalia opined that there was no social necessity like that 
demonstrated in Skinner, and therefore, no governmental interest strong 
enough to justify the drug testing policy.52 
Despite strong dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court did not find 
suspicionless drug testing in the workplace to be an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy until it considered such testing for candidates 
running for political office in Chandler v. Miller.53 
3. Chandler v. Miller:  The State of Georgia Takes the Special Needs 
Doctrine Too Far 
The Court held suspicionless drug testing to be unconstitutional for 
the first time in Chandler.54  In Chandler, nominees for state office 
challenged a Georgia statute that required each nominee to submit to a 
drug test within thirty days of being elected or qualifying for election.55  
In determining whether the testing was reasonable, the Court looked to 
guidance from its previous decisions in Von Raab and Skinner.56   
                                                 
51 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The dissenters felt that many of the 
facts the majority relied upon in Skinner were not present in Von Raab, stating, “The Court’s 
opinion . . . will be searched in vain for real evidence of a real problem that will be solved 
by urine testing. . . . To paraphrase Churchill, all this contains much that is obviously true, 
and much that is relevant; unfortunately, what is obviously true is not relevant, and what is 
relevant is not obviously true.”  Id. at 681-82. 
52 Id. at 683. 
What is absent in the Government’s justifications—notably absent, 
revealingly absent . . . is the recitation of even a single instance in which 
any of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an instance, that is, 
in which the cause of bribetaking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic 
law enforcement, or of compromise of classified information, was drug 
use. 
Id. 
53 See generally Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997); Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660. 
54 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323. 
55 Id. at 308.  The Court began its discussion by stipulating that urinalysis conducted by 
state officials has been established as a search under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Id; see supra note 34.  The plaintiffs were members of the Libertarian party 
who challenged a Georgia statute that provided “[e]ach candidate seeking to qualify for 
nomination or election to a state office shall as a condition of such qualification be required 
to certify that such candidate has tested negative for illegal drugs.” GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-
140 (1993). 
56 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318. 
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The issue in Chandler was whether the state’s interest in a drug 
testing program qualified as a special need.57  The Court stated that in 
order to satisfy the special need requirement, the reason for the test must 
be substantial enough to outweigh the individual’s privacy interest.58  
While the state argued that the drug tests were justified, the Court 
concluded that there was no concrete danger that would allow a Fourth 
Amendment exception for suspicionless testing.59 
More specifically, the Court found that the state had no legitimate 
purpose behind the statute, which addressed a drug problem that could 
be dealt with by ordinary law enforcement.60  But the Court stressed that 
the decision in Chandler could only be read in its narrow context.61  
Consequently, the Court held that the evidence presented by the State 
was insufficient to outweigh the privacy interest of the candidates.62  Yet 
the Court concluded that blanket drug testing policies can be 
constitutional in some cases, stating, “But where . . . public safety is not 
genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the 
suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged.”63 
                                                 
57 Id.  Candidates are given thirty days to be tested, are allowed to be tested by their own 
physician, and have access to the test results before anyone else.  Id. at 318, 320.  Once the 
urine specimen is provided, it is tested for five specified illegal drugs and the doctor 
prepares a certificate reporting the results of the candidate.  Id. at 310.  In the event that the 
candidate tests positive, he or she would have control over the release of the test results.  Id. 
at 312.  At that point, he or she could decide not to run for office and avoid anything being 
released to the public regarding drug use.  Id.  The information would also be kept from 
law enforcement.  Id. 
58 Id.  Georgia based its argument on the incompatibility of drug use in state positions.  
Id.  It argued that the candidate’s judgment and integrity would be impaired, which would 
detract from the public’s confidence in the candidate.  Id.  It also argued that anti-drug laws 
would be compromised.  Id. 
59 Id. at 318-19.  From the oral argument, when asked if whether there were particular 
instances of drug use by state officials, counsel for the state answered, “No, there is no such 
evidence, [and] to be frank, there is no such problem as we sit here today.”  Id. at 319. 
60 Id. at 320.  The Court found that the statute was not designed to identify candidates 
who were drug users, nor would it deter drug users from seeking state office.  Id. 
61 Id. at 320-21.  The Court stated that there was a telling difference between the duties of 
the employees in Von Raab and the candidates in Georgia.  Id.  Public office candidates are 
subject to more public scrutiny, while customs employees are not subject to the same 
scrutiny as those holding traditional jobs.  Id.  The state relied heavily on the precedent 
established in Von Raab.  Id. 
62 Id. at 321-22.  Instead of stating that the need of the state was a special need, thus 
qualifying as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court termed the need 
“symbolic.”  Id. at 322.  The Court went on to say that if a need only had to “set a good 
example,” then the Court’s opinions and descriptions in its previous cases that describe the 
special needs doctrine, were a waste of words and time.  Id. 
63 Id. at 323. 
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By 1987, the Court had established the framework of the special 
needs doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.64  Nonetheless, when it was 
first faced with a school district’s suspicionless drug testing policy for 
students, it had to consider the doctrine against prior case law 
concerning the constitutional rights of students. 
C. The Diminished Constitutional Rights of Students in Public Schools and 
the Enhanced Power of the State 
The Court has been inconsistent in determining what legal status 
students have vis-à-vis public schools and how constitutional rights 
should apply to them.65  The Court’s “reasonableness” inquiry must 
consider “the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for 
children.”66  At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, and at early 
common law, public schooling was not compulsory, and school 
administrators were considered to act in loco parentis.67  Under the in loco 
parentis doctrine, schools act in the role of parents in maintaining 
discipline in the school setting.68   
Since that time, with the advent of compulsory education laws in 
every state, schools have gradually taken on more of a state actor role, 
thus subjecting the school administrators to the constraints of the Fourth 
Amendment.69  Complimenting this change of jurisprudence is a recent, 
yet somewhat unrelated decision, Lawrence v. Texas,70 in which the Court 
acknowledged that “our laws and traditions in the past half century are 
of most relevance” in determining constitutional rights.71  New Jersey v. 
                                                 
64 See supra Part II.B. 
65 Compare Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), with Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968) (concerning students’ First Amendment 
constitutional rights). 
66 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656. 
67 Raby, supra note 24, at 1009.  In loco parentis is defined as “[a]cting as a temporary 
guardian of a child.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (7th ed. 1999). 
68 See Raby, supra note 24, at 1009; supra Part II.C. 
69 Raby, supra note 24, at 1010. 
70 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
71 Id. at 571-72.  While Lawrence was a somewhat unrelated case granting homosexuals a 
fundamental right of privacy against government intrusion under the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was a big step for the Court in expanding the general right 
of privacy.  Id.  While the right of privacy is not specifically enumerated in the text of the 
Constitution, it is now said to be a constitutional right found in the “penumbras” of the Bill 
or Rights.  Id. at 595; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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T.L.O.72 was the first case in which the Court considered how the Fourth 
Amendment should be applied in the school setting.73 
1. New Jersey v. T.L.O.:  Limited Student Rights in Public 
In T.L.O., a high school teacher caught two female students smoking 
in the school bathroom, in violation of a school rule, and took them to 
the principal’s office.74  The vice-principal searched the purse of T.L.O., 
found evidence of marijuana use, and turned the purse over to police.75  
T.L.O. filed suit and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “the 
broader question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on 
the activities of school authorities.”76 
The State of New Jersey’s first argument was that the Fourth 
Amendment was intended to apply to searches and seizures executed by 
law enforcement, not school officials.77  To address this issue, the Court 
considered whether public school officials are considered to function in 
the capacity of a state actor or that of a parent.78  The Court concluded 
that if school officials acted in a parental capacity, students would not be 
subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which requires the 
                                                 
72 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 328. 
75 Id.  The vice-principal was originally searching for cigarettes, but upon further 
examination, he discovered evidence associated with the use of marijuana and turned it 
over to police.  Id.  After removing the cigarettes, the vice-principal discovered rolling 
papers, then proceeded with a more thorough search of the purse, where he found a small 
amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a bundle of dollar bills, and a list of other 
students who owed T.L.O. money.  Id. 
76 Id. at 332.  Lower federal and state courts have struggled in trying to balance the 
Fourth Amendment rights of students and the need for schools to provide a safe learning 
environment.  Id. at 332 n.2.  Some have viewed schools as private parties “acting in loco 
parentis and . . . therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id.  
Other courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does apply in school settings, 
requiring probable cause before a search is constitutional, and in some courts the special 
needs doctrine has replaced the need for probable cause.  Id. 
77 Id. at 334. 
78 Id. at 336.  In addressing this issue, the Court considered previous decisions that have 
held school officials as state officials when applying the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (“The authority possessed by the State to 
prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools although concededly very broad, 
must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. . . .  The Due Process Clause 
also forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty.”); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
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involvement of state actors.79  The Court also established that the concept 
of schools acting in a parental role is not “consonant with compulsory 
education laws,” and concluded that teachers do not act as surrogates of 
the parents and thus, do not have the same freedom from the constraints 
of the Constitution that parents enjoy. 80 
After finding that school authorities are subject to the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court applied a reasonableness test to the specific facts 
of the case.81  The Court determined the reasonableness of the search by 
balancing the school’s need to search the student against a student’s 
right to privacy.82  This balancing test requires weighing a privacy 
interest that society is “prepared to recognize as legitimate,” against “the 
substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining 
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds.”83   
In addressing the issue of a student’s legitimate privacy concern, the 
Court first discarded the need for obtaining a warrant prior to searching 
a student.84  The Court next modified the requirement of suspicion and 
                                                 
79 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.  The Court rejected the notion that public schools exercise 
control as a parental figure, as they might in private schools.  Id.  The Court stated that such 
a view “is not entirely ‘consonant with compulsory education laws.’”  Id. 
80 Id.  “If  school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees 
of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be 
deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of 
their students.”  Id.  The Court also stated that, “the reasonableness standard should ensure 
that the interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the 
legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.”  Id. at 343. 
81 Id. at 337.  “On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate 
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need for 
effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.”  Id. 
82 Id.  According to the Court, a two-fold inquiry had to be satisfied: (1) whether the 
search was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the scope of the search was reasonably 
related to the circumstances.  Id. 
83 Id. at 338-39.  The Court recognized that maintaining order in the classroom is a 
difficult task and drug use has become a major social problem.  Id. 
84 Id. at 340.  The Court held that the warrant requirement 
would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal 
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.  Just as we have in 
other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when “the burden 
of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose 
behind the search,” we hold . . . that school officials need not obtain a 
warrant before searching a student who is under their authority. 
Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967)). 
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rejected the “probable cause” requirement, stating that the school setting 
requires a reasonableness that “stops short” of probable cause.85   
The Court applied a two-prong reasonableness test that it had 
conceived in Terry v. Ohio.86  Under this test, “one must [first] consider 
‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception’ . . . [and] second, 
one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.’”87  Accordingly, the Court held that the 
vice-principal did not act unreasonably in his search of T.L.O. regarding 
the cigarettes or the subsequent search for marijuana.88  The decision in 
T.L.O established a diminished right of privacy for students in public 
schools, setting the precedent for the Court to follow in reviewing a 
challenge to a school district’s suspicionless drug testing policy.89 
2. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton:  Urinalysis of Student Athletes 
Without Individualized Suspicion 
While T.L.O. addressed how the Fourth Amendment applies in the 
school setting, it did not address whether individualized suspicion was a 
necessary requirement in applying the reasonableness balancing test.90  
                                                 
85 Id. at 341.  The Court opined that probable cause is not an irreducible requirement of a 
valid search, stating, “Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interest 
suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of 
reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a 
standard.”  Id. 
86 Id.; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1962) (a criminal case involving an officer who 
searched the outer clothing of a criminal suspect and found a pistol in his pocket). 
87 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.  The Court stated: 
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or 
other school official will be “justified at its inception” when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up 
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or 
the rules of the school.  Such a search will be permissible in its scope 
when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of 
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of 
the student and the nature of the infraction. 
Id. at 341-42. 
88 Id. at 346-47. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 342 n.8.  However, in other contexts, the Court has held that “some quantum of 
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.”  Id.  
“Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only 
where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where ‘other 
safeguards’ are available ‘to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in the field.’”  Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)). 
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But in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,91 the Court was confronted 
with the issue of a generalized high school drug testing program. 
In Vernonia, the school district introduced the Student Athlete Drug 
Policy, which authorized random drug tests for its student athletes.92  
The school district implemented its drug testing program after 
recognizing a sudden influx of drug use in its schools.93  Athletes were 
particularly subject to the drug testing because the school district 
claimed that the athletes were at the forefront of the school’s drug 
culture.94 
As a result, the drug testing policy was implemented and applied to 
all students involved in interscholastic sports.95  The express purpose of 
                                                 
91 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995).  Respondent, James Acton, was a seventh grader in the 
Vernonia School District who wanted to play football in the fall of 1991.  Id. at 657.  In order 
to play, he and his parents were required to sign a form consenting to random drug testing.  
Id.  They refused to sign the forms and Acton was denied the right to join the football team 
as a result.  Id. 
92 Id. at 648.  The drug testing in question required student athletes and parents to sign a 
policy consenting to such random testing where they were tested at the beginning of their 
sport season, then were subject to random testing throughout the season.  Id. at 650.  
Students’ names were placed in a pool, from which 10% of the athletes were chosen for 
random testing.  Id.  Each student who was randomly selected was required to identify any 
prescription drugs that he or she was taking by showing the doctor’s prescription, then 
they were to enter an empty locker room to produce a urine sample in a bathroom where 
an adult supervisor of the same sex was present.  Id.  The supervisor was required to stand 
twelve to fifteen feet behind the student as he produced the urine sample.  Id.  The 
supervisor was instructed to listen for normal sounds of urination, then to check for 
tampering and any temperature inaccuracies of the urine sample.  Id.  The sample was then 
sent to an independent laboratory to be tested for amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana.  
Id.  The test results were then presented to the superintendent, school principal, vice-
principal, and athletic director for further action.  Id. at 650-51.  In pertinent part, the policy 
read, “I . . . authorize the Vernonia School District to conduct a test on a urine specimen 
which I provide to test for drugs and/or alcohol use.  I also authorize the release of 
information concerning the results of such a test to the Vernonia School District and to the 
parents and/or guardians of the student.”  Id. at 660. 
93 Id. at 648.  The school district observed that students were speaking out about the 
appeal of the drug culture and were bragging about how the school could not do anything.  
Id.  The school district also reported a rise in disciplinary problems, including use of 
profane language, rudeness, and student suspensions.  Id. at 648-49.  The school also 
introduced expert testimony confirming “the deleterious effects of drugs on motivation, 
memory, judgment, reaction, coordination, and performance.”  Id. at 649. 
94 Id.  According to the district court, “a large segment of the student body, particularly 
those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion.  Disciplinary actions 
had reached  ‘epidemic proportions.’” Id. 
95 Id. at 650.  Such blanket searches are a greater threat to citizens’ liberties than one 
based on individualized suspicion because of the vast population they reach without 
giving individuals the opportunity to avoid illegal conduct, thus, not subjecting themselves 
to such an invasion of privacy.  Id. at 669-70 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  “While the plain 
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the policy was to prevent drug use and to promote safety in the school 
district.96  The policy required students to submit to a drug test at the 
beginning of the season for their sport and also required written consent 
from both the student and his or her parents to be subjected to random 
testing throughout the school year.97  With his parents as co-plaintiffs, 
James Acton, a seventh-grade student athlete in the Vernonia school 
district, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that 
the policy was a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.98 
In reviewing the school district’s policy, the Supreme Court first 
considered the nature of the privacy interest at issue.99  The Court 
asserted that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not protect all subjective 
expectations of privacy,” and an expectation of privacy will differ 
depending upon the individual’s relationship with the state.100  In 
regards to the Vernonia School District’s policy, the Court determined 
that it was crucial that the policy pertained to children who were in the 
temporary custody of the state.101 
While the Court recognized that minors lack some of the 
fundamental rights of adults, it reiterated its holding from T.L.O. that 
schools do not act in loco parentis over its students.102  However, the 
                                                                                                             
language of the Amendment does not mandate individualized suspicion as a necessary 
component of all searches and seizures, the historical record demonstrates that the framers 
believed that individualized suspicion was an inherent quality of reasonable searches and 
seizures.”  Id. at 671 (quoting Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in 
Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 489 (1995)). 
96 Id. at 650 (majority opinion). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 651.  Acton also made a claim that the policy violated Article I, § 9 of the Oregon 
Constitution, which does not pertain to this Note.  Id. at 652. 
99 Id. at 654. 
100 Id. (stating that an individual’s expectations of privacy will vary depending on 
whether the individual is “at home, at work, in a car, or in a public park”).  The Court 
made only brief mention of the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment; it instead 
circumvented the “probable cause” and “warrant” language of the Amendment and 
quickly jumped into the discussion of the special needs doctrine because this did not 
concern criminal acts.  Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 353. 
101 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654. 
102 Id. at 654-55.  Despite the view taken by the Court, it also recognized that it “ha[s] 
acknowledged that for many purposes ‘school authorities ac[t] in loco parentis,’ with the 
power and indeed the duty to ‘inculcate the habits and manners of civility.’” Id. at 655 
(quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).  The Court has 
determined that private schools are in loco parentis, and are thus exercising the role of a 
surrogate parent in regard to its students.  Id.; New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).  
If a school is said to act in loco parentis, it is not considered to be a state actor, and thus, is 
free to conduct searches outside the scope of the Constitution.  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. 
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Court emphasized the “custodial and tutelary” power of schools that 
allows for schools to apply a degree of supervision to students that is 
greater than that imposed on adults.103  Additionally, the Court stated 
that the school’s custodial and tutelary responsibility should be taken 
into account when considering the reasonableness of the Fourth 
Amendment protection of students.104  But after recognizing a 
diminished expectation of privacy for students in general, the Court still 
held that student athletes have an even lesser expectation of privacy due 
to the nature of athletics.105 
After considering the scope of the privacy intrusion, the Court 
considered the character of the intrusion.106  Reiterating that drug testing 
by urinalysis should involve the utmost privacy protection, the Court 
determined that collecting a urine sample in the manner done by the 
Vernonia School District was non-invasive and thus created a negligible 
privacy concern.107 
The Court also considered whether or not the school had a 
compelling interest in conducting urinalysis drug testing on student 
athletes.108  Specifically, the Court defined this interest as one “that 
appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light 
of other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a 
genuine expectation of privacy.”109  The need not be compelling, but 
                                                 
103 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-55 (suggesting that T.L.O. emphasized this view, instead of 
denying it).  The Court then limited this protection, stating, “we do not . . . suggest that 
public schools . . . have such a degree of control . . . to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to 
protect.’” Id. at 655 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 200 (1989)). 
104 Id. at 656 (citing to vision, dental, and hearing tests that are routinely performed on 
students, as well as state required immunizations, which are requirements for all public 
school students). 
105 Id. at 657.  “School sports are not for the bashful.  They require ‘suiting up’ before each 
practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards.  Public school locker rooms, the 
usual sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy they afford.”  Id. 
106 Id. at 658. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 660.  Relying on its holdings in both Von Raab and Skinner, the Court looked to 
whether or not the school district “demonstrate[d] a ‘compelling need’ for the program.”  
Id. at 661. 
109 Id.  While the difference between “compelling” and “important” may seem to be of 
little significance, the language is highly significant when it relates to the level of scrutiny 
being applied by the Court.  Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 364.  In both Skinner and Von Raab, 
the Court found the governmental interests to be “compelling,” which indicates that the 
regulation was examined under strict scrutiny.  Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.  Under strict 
scrutiny, the law or regulation would be presumptively invalid unless the government 
could show a compelling state interest and the Court determines that the law was narrowly 
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instead only an “important” need, and the Vernonia School District’s 
policy satisfied the governmental interest requirement without 
individualized suspicion because the need to prevent athletes from drug 
use outweighed the student’s expectation of privacy.110 
Finally, the Court narrowed its opinion, declaring that its decision 
applied solely to student athletes because of the immediate threat of 
physical harm that athletes may face from drug use.111  The drug testing 
policy in Vernonia was found reasonable, and thus, constitutional, 
because it fell within the reasonable role that the school takes on as a 
guardian and tutor.112 
After the decision in Vernonia, district courts were split as to how far 
the scope of student drug testing should extend, particularly as school 
districts drafted drug testing policies that reached beyond student 
                                                                                                             
tailored to achieve its purpose.  See PALMER, supra note 13.  Interestingly, the Court 
downplayed the significance of the “compelling” language in determining the 
government’s interest, by stating, “[i]t is a mistake . . . to think that the phrase ‘compelling 
state interest,’ in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum quantum of 
governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation the 
question:  is there a compelling state interest here?”  Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.  Instead of 
answering this question in isolation, the Court determined that the school district had an 
important interest “in light of” the other factors involved in the search.  Id.  Additionally, 
instead of considering each prong of the balancing test individually, and then measuring 
the competing interests, the Court bolstered its governmental interest here, but injected the 
other two prongs into its analysis of the governmental interest.  Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 
365. 
110 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.  The Court interpreted the phrase “compelling state interest” 
differently than it has in prior cases.  Id.  In the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has 
interpreted it to “describe[ ] a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern.”  Id.  
The Court stated, “[w]hether that relatively high degree of government concern is 
necessary in this case or not, we think it is met.”  Id.  Additionally, 
School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and 
addictive effects of drugs are most severe.  “Maturing nervous systems 
are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are; 
childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound”; “children 
grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record 
of recovery is depressingly poor.” 
Id. 
111 Id. at 662.  “Apart from psychological effects, which include impairment of judgment, 
slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain, the particular drugs screened 
by the District’s Policy have been demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to 
athletes.”  Id.  The Court accepted the district court’s finding that there was an immediate 
threat to safety, that the athletes were rebelling and that the problem had reached 
“epidemic proportions.”  Id. at 663 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 
1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)). 
112 Id. at 656. 
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athletes.113  In 2002, the Court granted certiorari in a case involving a 
school policy that extended drug testing to all students participating in 
extracurricular activities.114 
3. Board of Education v. Earls:  The Current Urinalysis Standard Extends 
to Extracurricular Activities 
In 1998, the Tecumseh, Oklahoma school district implemented a 
policy that required all students involved in extracurricular activities to 
submit to random drug tests.115  Respondents, who were involved in 
extracurricular activities at the school and subjected to random drug 
testing, challenged the constitutionality of the policy under the Fourth 
Amendment, arguing that the school district failed to identify a special 
need for the policy.116  Additionally, respondents argued that the policy 
should be based on at least a minimum level of individualized 
suspicion.117  However, the Court reiterated that individualized 
suspicion is not always necessary and a search without such suspicion 
may be constitutional when there are “special [governmental] needs.”118  
First, the Court addressed the privacy interest that the drug testing 
policy threatened to violate.119  Respondents argued that students 
participating in extracurricular activities other than sports were not 
subjected to the same communal undress and physical examinations as 
                                                 
113 Compare Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), and Tannahill v. Lockney 
Indep. Sch., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001), and Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., 183 
F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Tex. 2000), with Willis v. Anderson Cmty. Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415 
(7th Cir. 1998), and Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998), reh’g en banc 
denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998). 
114 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002). 
115 Id. at 826.  The policy required students to take a drug test prior to participation in an 
extracurricular activity, and also to be subjected to random testing throughout their 
involvement in the activity.  Id.  The policy reached to programs “such as the Academic 
Team, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, band, choir, pom pon, 
cheerleading, and athletics.”  Id. 
116 Id. at 826-27.  Respondent, Lindsay Earls was involved in show choir, marching band, 
the Academic Team, and the National Honor Society.  Id. at 826.  Respondent, Daniel James 
was seeking participation in the Academic Team.  Id. at 827.  Again, the respondents 
included students who were denied participation and their parents.  Id.  Despite the fact 
that the parents were parties to the suit, the Court never mentioned the interest the parents 
have in raising their children as they see fit.  Id.  Petitioners challenged the policy both on 
its face and as applied to students involved in extracurricular activities.  Id. 
117 Id. at 829.  Respondents did not challenge the application of the policy to athletes and 
did not make a probable cause argument and asked the Court only to consider 
individualized suspicion.  Id. 
118 Id.  “We have long held that ‘the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible 
requirement of [individualized] suspicion.’”  Id. 
119 Id. at 830. 
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athletes, and therefore had a greater expectation of privacy.120  But the 
Court discarded that argument, stating that “[t]his distinction . . . was 
not essential to our decision in Vernonia, which depended primarily 
upon the school’s custodial responsibility and authority.”121  Next, the 
Court considered the second prong of the balancing test:  the level of 
intrusion imposed on the students by the drug testing policy.122  The 
Court emphasized that although urinalysis testing should be afforded 
substantial privacy, the need to monitor and supervise students must be 
considered as well.  Accordingly, the Court found the drug testing policy 
in Earls to be very similar to that in Vernonia, in fact, even less intrusive, 
and concluded that the invasion of the students’ privacy was 
insignificant.123 
The Court’s third and final issue to consider was the “nature and 
immediacy of the government’s concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in 
meeting them.”124  Because no individualized concern in the school 
district existed, the Court addressed the drug abuse problems confronted 
by youths in general, stating that, “the nationwide drug epidemic makes 
the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.”125  The Court 
                                                 
120 Id. at 831.  The Vernonia Court decided that students who subject themselves to 
competitive extracurricular activities subject themselves to the same diminished privacy as 
student athletes.  Id.  The Court recognized that some of these activities required off-
campus travel and the same communal undress experienced by student athletes.  Id.  
Further, many of these activities were highly regulated by the policies of the Oklahoma 
Secondary Schools Activity Association.  Id.  The Court found this regulation to be 
analogous to the adults who choose to work in a highly regulated industry such as in Von 
Raab and Skinner.  Id. at 832. 
121 Id. at 831.  The Court then explained that students involved in extracurricular 
activities also have subjected themselves to limited expectations of privacy similar to those 
of athletes.  Id.  The Court used the example of clubs and activities that require off-campus 
travel and communal undress.  Id. at 832.  The Court also placed significance in the fact that 
the school board’s policy required that the test results remain confidential and access to 
them was only on a “need to know” basis.  Id. at 833.  The school policy also assured that 
the outcome of the test would not have any criminal repercussions or any bearing on the 
student’s academic standing; the only punishment would be a denial of that student’s 
extracurricular activity and notification of the student’s parents.  Id. 
122 Id. at 832. 
123 Id. at 833 (holding that this policy was even less intrusive than that of Vernonia 
because the results were not turned over to law enforcement, there was no academic 
disciplinary action, and the only discipline applied was limiting the student’s participation 
in the extracurricular activity). 
124 Id. at 834.  Again, the Court did not specifically address a standard of review that 
must be met.  Id. at 836.  The Court found the school district’s concerns to be “legitimate,” 
but never made any mention of a “compelling” standard that would be required under 
strict scrutiny.  Id. 
125 Id. at 834.  The Court cited studies that showed the rising number of high school 
seniors reporting they had used drugs since 1995.  Id.  For instance, the number of seniors 
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relied heavily on the suspicionless policy it upheld in Von Raab, noting 
that drug abuse is a national problem and because the government has a 
need to prevent this problem, the Court accepts the school district’s 
immediacy argument, making the drug testing necessary under the test 
established in Vernonia.126  In expanding Vernonia, the Court emphasized 
that the safety interest in deterring drug use is important to all students, 
not just athletes.127    
However, Justice Ginsburg, joined by three other justices, wrote a 
scathing dissenting opinion, stating that, “The particular testing program 
upheld today is not reasonable; it is capricious, even perverse:  
Petitioners’ policy targets for testing a student population least likely to 
be at risk from illicit drugs and their damaging effects.”128  The dissenters 
opined that the lack of suspicion prior to the implementation of the 
policy was a dispositive factor in distinguishing this case from Vernonia, 
                                                                                                             
using any illicit drug increased from 48.4% in 1995 to 53.9% in 2001.  Id.  The number of 
seniors reporting they had used marijuana jumped from 41.7% to 49.0% during the same 
period.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
126 Id. at 835.  The Court stated that, “it would make little sense to require a school district 
to wait for a substantial portion of its students to begin using drugs before it was allowed 
to institute a drug testing program designed to deter drug use.”  Id. at 836.  In the criminal 
context, this is exactly the governmental behavior that the probable cause provision of the 
Fourth Amendment is intended to protect.  Id.  While the Court relied heavily on Von Raab 
in upholding the drug testing policy, it failed to consider the voluntary nature of working 
for the United States Custom Service and the mandatory nature of public schooling.  Id.  
While participation in extracurricular activities is not mandatory, studies have shown that 
nearly 80% of high school seniors participate in extracurricular activities.  Nicholas A. 
Palumbo, Note & Comment, Protecting Access to Extracurricular Activities: The Need To 
Recognize a Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate Education, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 393, 
394 (2002).  It is more fitting to consider extracurricular activities to be a requirement of 
students who wish to excel beyond the bare minimum high school requirements.  Id.  In 
fact, former president Ronald Reagan referred to extracurricular activities as “valuable 
opportunities to discover and develop talent in areas other than those covered within the 
classroom.”  Id. at 393. 
127 Earls, 536 U.S. at 838.  However, the dissent points out that, “[h]ad the Vernonia Court 
agreed that public school attendance, in and of itself, permitted the State to test each 
student’s blood or urine for drugs, the opinion in Vernonia could have saved many words.”  
Id. at 845 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Court explained that although the policy in 
Vernonia had a closer fit to addressing a specific problem, the school district’s policy in 
Earls was still consistent with the school’s custodial responsibility.  Id. at 838 (majority 
opinion).  While the Court upheld the reasonableness of the school district’s policy, it did 
so expressing no opinion as to the wisdom of such policies.  Id. 
128 Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the school district’s special needs 
“are not so expansive or malleable as to render reasonable any program of student drug 
testing a school district elects to install”). 
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which cited a specific problem great enough to invoke the special needs 
doctrine.129   
The dissent argued that the Vernonia decision could not be 
interpreted to “endorse invasive and suspicionless drug testing of all 
students upon any evidence of drug use, solely because drugs jeopardize 
the life and health of those who use them.”130  The dissent also pointed 
out that the Vernonia majority conspicuously did not go so far as to 
permit drug testing of all students enrolled in public schools.131  
The Earls dissenters then addressed each step of the Vernonia 
balancing test, first considering the nature of the privacy intrusion.132  
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg examined the Vernonia Court’s specific 
emphasis on the limited privacy expectations of student athletes, who 
subject themselves to communal dressing by choosing to “go out for the 
team.”133  While the Vernonia Court held that athletics are “not for the 
bashful,” the Earls dissent held that other extracurricular activities cater 
to all types of students, including those who are modest and shy.134 
In examining the third prong of the balancing test—the immediacy 
of the governmental concern—the dissenters focused on the stark 
contrast between the reasoning behind the policy in Vernonia, and that in 
Earls, where the school district had consistently reported to the federal 
government that no drug problem existed in its school district.135  The 
dissent agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion, that “without a 
demonstrated drug abuse problem among the group being tested, the 
                                                 
129 Id. at 844. 
130 Id. (stating that a student who has a personal privacy interest in the items she brings 
to school should also have that same privacy expectation regarding the chemical 
composition of her urine). 
131 Id. at 845 (stating that if it had chosen to extend such testing to all students, it “could 
have saved many words”).  As Justice Ginsburg interpreted the Court’s decision in her 
concurring opinion in Vernonia, “the Court’s opinion . . . reserve[s] the question whether 
the District, on no more than the showing made here, constitutionally could impose routine 
drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in team sports, but on all 
students required to attend school.”  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
132 Earls, 536 U.S at 847 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
133 Id.; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. 
134 Earls, 536 U.S at 848 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The dissent next considered the second 
prong of the Vernonia  test, “the character of the intrusion . . . complained of,” which is 
outside the purview of this Note; for a discussion of this topic, see id. at  842. 
135 Id. at 849 (citing Tecumseh School’s Application for Funds under the Safe and Drug-
Free Schools and Communities Program, stating, “types of drugs [other than alcohol and 
tobacco] including controlled dangerous substances, are present [in the schools] but have 
not identified themselves as major problems at this time”). 
Donaldson: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Urinalysis:  The Constitutional
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
840 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
efficacy of the District’s solution to its perceived problem is . . . greatly 
diminished.”136 
Finally, distinguishing the drug testing in Earls from the 
suspicionless testing in both Skinner and Von Raab, the dissent found that 
both policies were implemented to save lives rather than to protect the 
health risks that are associated with drug use.137  The dissent noted the 
“sad irony” of the schools tutelary and custodial responsibility, which 
“require[s] them to ‘teach by example’ by avoiding symbolic measures 
that diminish constitutional protections.”138 
According to the dissent, Vernonia was a correct decision for two 
reasons:  (1) the “special health risks” of student athletes; and (2) the 
school district’s contention that the athletes “were the leaders of the drug 
culture” that the policy was intended to punish.139  Neither of these 
reasons were present prior to the school district’s policy in Earls, which 
the dissenters suggested should be the dispositive factor in holding such 
a policy unconstitutional.140  Yet while the dissent attempted to 
distinguish Earls from Vernonia, it failed to mention a significant 
fundamental right, which was present in both cases, but never 
considered:  parents’ fundamental right to control the upbringing of their 
children.141 
D. Do Parents Have a Voice in the Matter? 
In both Vernonia and Earls, the parents of the students also refused to 
consent to the drug testing and were parties to the suit against the 
school.142  Noticeably absent in the Court’s discussion in either case was 
                                                 
136 Id. at 850 (quoting Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1277 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
137 Id. at 851-52. 
138 Id. at 855.  “That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for 
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle 
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our 
government as mere platitudes.” Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
637 (1943)).  Additionally, in T.L.O., the Court had emphasized that 
children learn as much by example as by exposition.  It would be 
incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing 
their students with an understanding of our system of constitutional 
democracy, while at the same time immunizing those same teachers 
from the need to respect constitutional protections. 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985). 
139 Earls, 536 U.S. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995)). 
140 Id. at 849. 
141 Id.; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 78 (2000). 
142 Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648. 
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any mention of parents’ interest in controlling the upbringing of their 
children.143  While the Court’s standard of review regarding parents’ 
rights to control the upbringing of their children has not always been 
consistent, it has recognized that a parent’s right to control the 
upbringing of their children is a fundamental right protected under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.144  
However, the Court has not consistently applied a level of scrutiny 
when adjudicating the parental right to control the upbringing of 
children.145  The plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville labeled the right 
                                                 
143 Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648. 
144 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66.  Summing up its  jurisprudence in this area, in the plurality 
opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote: 
The liberty interest at issue in this case–the interest of parents in the 
care, custody, and control of their children–is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.  More than 75 
years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, we held that the “liberty” protected by 
the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a 
home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their 
own.”  Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, we again held that 
the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right “to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control.”  We 
explained in Pierce that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the 
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations.”  We returned to the subject in Prince v. 
Massachusetts, and again confirmed that there is a constitutional 
dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children.  “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of 
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor hinder.” 
Id.; see William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Parental Rights 
Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177 (2000).  The Court first recognized the Due 
Process protection of parents to control the upbringing of their children in two cases 
decided in the 1920s.  See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923).  The Court in Pierce held that parents and guardians “have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [children] for additional obligations.”  
268 U.S. at 535.  “Our cases, it is true, have not set out exact metes and bounds to the 
protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his child.”  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 
(Souter, J., concurring). 
145 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J. concurring).  “The opinions . . . recognize such a 
right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review.  I would 
apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.”  Id.  Most rights that are 
labeled as “fundamental” by the Court will be analyzed under strict scrutiny.  However, 
even though it is a fundamental right, the Court offers limited protection of parents’ right 
to control the upbringing of their children.  Deana A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: 
A Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 454 (2002).  The Court has never applied 
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of parents to control the upbringing of their children as a fundamental 
right, but refused to establish an applicable level of scrutiny.146  Yet in a 
prior case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,147 the Court demonstrated the flexibility of 
its application of the parents’ fundamental rights, and struck down a 
state compulsory education law when it combined the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment rights with the parents’ right to control the upbringing of 
their children.148  The plaintiff’s argument in Yoder challenging the state’s 
compulsory education law was bolstered by the hybrid challenge.149   
But the Court’s precedent in hybrid cases is still unclear when 
challenges are made combining the parents’ right to control the 
upbringing of their children with an enumerated constitutional right, but 
the Court’s holdings in Yoder and Troxel could strengthen a plaintiff’s 
argument when challenging a school district’s suspicionless drug testing 
policy.150  If the Court were to consider this fundamental right in the 
future, its outcome may be different from the few limitations school 
districts now have following the holding in Earls.151 
E. Limitations on School Districts Post-Earls 
The Supreme Court has not suggested that there is any limitation on 
how far school districts can expand drug testing policies.152  Nonetheless, 
there has recently been a push by some states and the federal 
government to pursue these policies more aggressively.153  In his 2004 
State of the Union address, President Bush proposed federal funding for 
such programs, stating: 
                                                                                                             
strict nor intermediate scrutiny to the parental right and the strength of this fundamental 
right is still unclear.  Id. 
146 See Troxel, 530 U.S. 57. 
147 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
148 Id. at 233. 
149 Id.  The Court stated, “rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by 
legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the 
State.”  Id. 
150 Ross, supra note 144, at 185. 
151 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
152 See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
153 Office of National Drug Control Policy, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/ 
publications/drug_testing/index.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2005); Chris Newmarker, New 
Jersey to Test High-School Athletes for Drugs, SEATTLE TIMES, May 6, 2006, available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/highschoolsports/2002975668_prepjersey06.html; 
ESPN, Official Wants Texas High School Athletes Tested, Jan. 27, 2007, available at 
http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/news/story?id=2744977. 
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In my budget, I proposed new funding to continue our 
aggressive, community-based strategy to reduce 
demand for illegal drugs.  Drug testing in our schools 
has proven to be an effective part of this effort.  So 
tonight I proposed an additional $23 million for schools 
that want to use drug testing as a tool to save children’s 
lives.  The aim here is not to punish children, but to send 
them this message:  We love you, and we don’t want to 
lose you.154 
While a bill was never promulgated,155 the White House has 
continued to pursue its aggressive policy toward student drug testing 
through the Office of National Drug Control, whose director, John P. 
Walters, has labeled student drug testing as the “silver bullet” in 
combating student drug use.156  Despite the strong push by the federal 
government and the Court’s willingness to uphold school district drug 
testing policies, there has been some restraint shown in not allowing 
universal drug testing in public schools.157  In 2001, the Northern District 
of Texas decided the constitutionality of a suspicionless drug testing 
program that applied to all students enrolled in a public school.158 
1. Tannahill v. Lockney Independent School District:  Compulsory Testing 
Policy Struck Down Under Vernonia 
In 2001, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas struck down a school district’s drug testing policy that extended to 
all students.159  Because this case was decided prior to the Earls decision, 
                                                 
154 Bush, supra note 16. 
155 Empowering Parents and Teachers for a Drug-Free Education Act of 2004, H.R. 3720, 
108th Cong. § 2(d) (2004).  The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives and 
proposed $23 million in funding.  Id. 
156 JOHN P. WALTERS, OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT DRUG TESTING IN SCHOOLS, available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/ 
pdf/drug_testing.pdf. 
157 Id.  See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646; Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
158 Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d 919. 
159 Id. at 920 n.1.  Prior to the implementation of the policy in question, Lockney 
Independent School District had established a suspicion-based testing program for all 
students and staff members who had a reasonable suspicion of being under the influence at 
school functions.  Id.  A reasonable suspicion was said to exist when a student or staff 
member displayed “at risk” behavior.  Id.  The school district discussed a policy that would 
apply to students involved in extracurricular activities, but, after debate, the school board 
made a final decision to subject all students to a suspicionless drug testing program that 
would require mandatory testing for all incoming sixth graders and monthly testing of 10% 
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the court used the Vernonia balancing test and determined that the drug 
testing policy was unconstitutional.160  The court reasoned that 
compulsory attendance is different from the voluntary participation in 
extracurricular activities and it would not be reasonable to subject all 
students to suspicionless drug testing.161 
More specifically, in Tannahill, the court recognized that the general 
student population should enjoy greater privacy than student athletes.162  
Additionally, the court distinguished suspicionless drug testing of 
students from the testing imposed in highly regulated industries, 
holding that the government did not have a compelling interest in 
implementing such drug tests in public schools.163  Though the district 
court recognized the good faith attempt of the school district, the court 
found the privacy rights of students to be more important than the 
governmental interest.164 
While this drug testing policy was declared unconstitutional under 
the Vernonia balancing test prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Earls, 
such post-Earls policies may withstand constitutional challenges by 
                                                                                                             
of the school’s students.  Id. at 921-22.  The school board cited a significant drug problem in 
the area as its reason for implementing the program.  Id. 
160 Id. at 930-31.  In its interpretation on the Vernonia decision, the United States District 
Court of the Northern District of Texas relied on the Supreme Court’s discussion as to why 
student athletes have a lesser expectation of privacy than the student population in general.  
Id. at 929.  The Texas Court said that “compulsory attendance at school is much different 
than voluntary participation in extracurricular activities.”  Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id.  “Every child, at least in Texas, must attend school.  School attendance does not 
trigger an instant diminution of rights.”  Id. at 929 n.22 (quoting Brooks v. East Chambers 
Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1989)). 
163 Id. at 930. 
[T]he academic studies of a student, while very important, do not 
embody the immediate and severe life and death repercussions as do 
the decisions of these employees.  A student’s tools of pens, notebook 
paper, and protractors have never been equated with locomotives, the 
hazardous chemicals and equipment of a custodian, the firearms or 
interdiction efforts of a customs agent, or the prescription pads and 
EKG machines used by a physician. 
Id. 
164 Id.  The district court stressed that the student body in general has a higher 
expectation of privacy than the student athletes in Vernonia, whom the Supreme Court 
decided had a lower expectation of privacy.  Id.  The district court also rejected the school 
district’s rationale for the suspicionless drug testing program, which was that the school 
district had a significant drug and alcohol problem.  Id.  The school district’s prior drug 
testing program had been in place for several years, yet had never encountered a single 
incident of drug use indicating a drug problem in the school district.  Id. 
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applying the less restrictive reasoning used in Earls.165  Following the 
Court’s decision in Vernonia, district courts were split on the issue of how 
far student drug testing policies could extend.166  Now, with the more 
expansive decision in Earls, school districts have again been given no 
specific limitations as to which students should be subjected to 
suspicionless drug testing.167 
In recent years, schools have extended their drug testing policies 
beyond that of student athletes and students participating in 
extracurricular activities.168  Some schools have expanded the reach of 
their drug testing policies to students who drive to school, while others 
have expanded the reach to all students enrolled at the school.169  While 
the Court has emphasized the importance of limiting students’ exposure 
to suspicionless drug testing to those students who have voluntarily 
subjected themselves to privileged activities, the Court’s holding in Earls 
opened the door to suspicionless testing for an even broader category of 
students, which could have dangerous implications on students’ rights 
to privacy while also sending a message contrary to the fundamental 
tenet of American jurisprudence—guilty until proven innocent.170 
                                                 
165 See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646 (1995); Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d 919. 
166 See Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 919.  See generally Trinidad Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 963 
P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998). 
167 Earls, 536 U.S. 822. 
168 See Drug Testing Fails, supra note 14 (follow “Alexander [Ohio] School District” 
hyperlink  and the “Katy [Texas] School District” hyperlink). 
169 See id.  (follow “Alexander [Ohio] School District” hyperlink and the “Tippecanoe 
(Ind.) School Corp.” hyperlink); see also YAMAGUCHI, JOHNSTON & O’MALLEY, supra note 14, 
at 159. 
170 See Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646. The decisions in both Earls and Vernonia 
spend a great deal of time discussing how lower expectations of privacy are appreciated by 
our “students” in our “public schools” before going into an analysis of how it applies 
specifically to athletes and students involved in extracurricular activities.  Rosenberg, supra 
note 30, at 360.  Rosenberg states that this general classification of students is telling 
because there is no reason that a drug testing policy that is made applicable to all students 
would be given any less deference than that applied to student athletes.  Id.  In assessing 
the governmental interest in conducting suspicionless drug testing, the Court first 
considered how drugs can have more damaging and addictive effects on developing minds 
than on adults.  Id.  The Court also considered the effects of drugs on the school population 
as a whole, the parens patriae interest the school has over the children, and the special need 
athletes may have in the examination of their physical health and their diminished 
expectation of privacy.  Id.  As Rosenberg points out, only the last factor, applying to 
student athletes, would have an application that would not also apply to the student 
population as a whole.  Id.  In Earls, the Court considered the same factors, but made the 
same exception for students involved in extracurricular activities.  536 U.S. at 838.  In 
reading the Court’s reasoning for students involved in extracurricular activities having a 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Since the introduction of the special needs doctrine in Skinner and 
Von Raab, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions have gradually 
broadened the doctrine’s scope.171  This Part will first demonstrate how a 
school-wide drug testing policy would likely be upheld if the Court were 
confronted with the issue today.172  Part III will also discuss the negative 
effects such a policy would have on America’s youth.173 
The cases discussed in Part II of this Note described the route the 
Court took in diluting the language of the Fourth Amendment to uphold 
the constitutionality of suspicionless student drug testing.174  
Additionally, Part II demonstrated how the Court has been inconsistent 
in its application and has given great deference to school policies, which 
cite society’s drug problem with no reference to individualized suspicion 
in schools.175  Part III.A will discuss how the Earls Court disregarded 
much of the reasoning it used in Vernonia to again broaden the scope of 
student drug testing.176  
Part III will look at each element of the Court’s reasoning to 
demonstrate how the same reasoning would apply to all students 
enrolled in a public school.177  Part III.B will discuss the social policy of 
sending a message to schoolchildren that they are guilty until proven 
innocent, and the importance of preserving the constitutional rights of 
students in public schools.178  Finally, Part III.C will discuss the 
possibility of compulsory drug testing at schools and will discuss how a 
blanket policy such as the national “war on drugs” should not be 
adequate to substitute for the individualized suspicion that was 
previously required before conducting searches in schools under the 
Fourth Amendment.179 
                                                                                                             
lesser expectation of privacy, it is hard to find a meaningful difference between the 
communal undress experienced in extracurricular activities to that of a required physical 
education class.  Rosenberg, supra note 30. 
171 See supra Part II.C. 
172 See infra Part III.C. 
173 See infra Part III.B. 
174 See supra Part II. 
175 See supra Part II. 
176 See infra Part III.A. 
177 See infra Part III. 
178 See infra Part III.B. 
179 See infra Part III.C. 
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A. The Earls Expansion of Reasonableness and the Flexibility that the 
Decision Creates for Schools To Impose Drug Testing Policies 
While no court has ruled on the constitutionality of a drug testing 
program as applied to all students since Tannahill, the reasoning in Earls 
suggests that such a policy might be held constitutional if the issue were 
to arise in the future.180  When the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
suspicionless drug testing in Von Raab, Skinner, Vernonia, and Chandler, it 
was careful to suggest that its decisions were only based on the 
balancing of the unique factors relevant to each case.181  However, the 
Earls decision again left school districts guessing as to how far they can 
go in administering suspicionless drug tests to their students.182  To 
demonstrate, it is first necessary to examine the erosion of students’ 
privacy interests that occurred between the decision in Vernonia and in 
Earls.183 
1. The Nature of the Privacy Interest Intruded Upon 
In Vernonia, where the constitutionality of suspicionless testing for 
student athletes was upheld, the Court first discussed how student 
athletes have a lesser expectation of privacy because of the communal 
undress they are subjected to on a routine basis.184  While the Vernonia 
Court spent a significant amount of time explaining the diminished 
privacy expectations of athletes, it quickly dismissed the significance of 
the student athlete status in Earls.185  In fact, in Earls, the Court stated 
that the Vernonia language regarding student athletes was not central to 
its decision, and in any event, students involved in extracurricular 
activities are subject to the same types of intrusions as athletes.186  After 
determining that the characteristics of student-athletics were not a 
central issue, the Court defended its prior reasoning and stated that 
many clubs and activities participate in off-campus travel and communal 
undress, which lessens the students’ right to privacy.187  However, as the 
dissent in Earls points out, it does not make sense for the Court to write 
                                                 
180 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 832 (2002); Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 
133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 920 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
181 See supra Part II. 
182 Earls, 536 U.S. at 844. 
183 Id. at. 822; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
184 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.  “By choosing to ‘go out for the team,’ they voluntarily 
subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students 
generally.”  Id. 
185 Compare id. at 648, with Earls, 536 U.S. at 830. 
186 Earls, 536 U.S. at 830. 
187 Id. at 832. 
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extensively on an aspect of its reasoning unless it is central to its 
holding.188  
Additionally, the Court’s argument that students’ rights to privacy 
are lessened because they are already subjected to health tests such as 
vaccinations and physical exams also goes unfounded.189  While students 
are required to submit to such examinations, these tests are performed 
by an individual student’s family physician and can be done on the 
student’s own time.190  These tests are not conducted in search of 
“anything in particular,” and thus, there is nothing to give rise to 
suspicion.191  Such tests do not violate the student’s right of privacy as 
much as subjecting the student to a random test while at school under 
the close scrutiny of a supervisor who hovers behind the student 
providing the urine sample.192 
While the Court in Vernonia and Earls opened the door to school 
district drug testing policies for students involved in athletics and 
extracurricular activities, it conspicuously omitted discussion as to 
whether such a policy should apply to all students.193  However, by its 
broad rationale, any student participating in physical education class, 
which is mandatory in many states, could be subjected to suspicionless 
drug testing.194  Like the communal undress, which the Court used to 
justify an eroded privacy interest in the athletic context, students 
involved in physical education are also required to change clothes and 
shower for class.195   
Participation in physical education class also places students in the 
same health risk category, due to the physical exertion, that the Court 
heavily relied upon in upholding drug testing in Vernonia.196  Like 
athletes and students involved in extracurricular activities, all students 
enrolled in public school are required to receive various vaccines and 
                                                 
188 Id. 
189 See supra Part II.C.3. 
190 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 312 (1997).  In Chandler, this was a factor added to the 
balancing test which diminished the argument for an invasion of privacy.  Id. 
191 Id. 
192 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
193 See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
194 Raby, supra note 24, at 1024 (discussing why all students in public schools should be 
subjected to random drug testing). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
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physical examinations, again leaving them subject to suspicionless drug 
testing following the reasoning in Earls.197     
2. Character of the Intrusion 
The Earls Court next determined the nature of the intrusion 
introduced by the school policy.198  Neither the Earls Court nor the 
Vernonia Court gave much weight to students’ rights of privacy, 
notwithstanding precedent that described privacy as, “the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.”199  Instead, the Court compared the privacy intrusion to 
conditions “typically encountered in public restrooms, which men, 
women, and especially schoolchildren use daily.”200 
This comparison fails to consider important differences between 
typical urination in a public restroom and the method of drug testing 
that requires a student to urinate under surveillance.201  One does not 
typically expect to be monitored while urinating in a public restroom 
with the expectation of producing a urine sample for inspection.202  Also, 
one typically urinating in a public restroom is not required to capture his 
or her urine in a container, which will later be subjected to scientific drug 
analysis.203  Finally, students subjected to such random testing are often 
removed during class hours and required to urinate in a designated 
testing area.204 
The Court’s determination of such a limited privacy interest is also 
contrary to its privacy evaluation in Skinner, where it noted that the 
urinalysis was less intrusive because the urine sample was collected in a 
medical office and was not subject to close monitoring of a supervisor.205  
Also, the testing in Skinner was conducted by an anonymous medical 
practitioner, as opposed to a familiar teacher whom the students would 
be interacting with on a daily basis.206  These factors, which were directly 
emphasized in prior case law, were not even considered by the Court in 
                                                 
197 Id. 
198 Earls, 536 U.S. at 832. 
199 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
200 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995). 
201 Darrel Jackson, The Constitution Expelled: What Remains of Students’ Fourth Amendment 
Rights?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 673, 684 (1996). 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
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Vernonia or Earls.207  As a result, while the Court in Vernonia overlooked 
many factors it could have considered in evaluating the student’s 
privacy interest, it gave even less weight to the student’s right of privacy 
in Earls.208  
3. Immediacy of the Governmental Concern  
Finally, the Earls Court found a pressing concern by meshing the 
limited evidence of drug use in the school district with the national 
concern of a drug epidemic.209  The Court relied heavily on its decision in 
Von Raab, which held drug testing constitutional on a mere showing that 
drug abuse is a serious societal problem.210  However, these societal 
issues were applied in Von Raab on the specific facts of the case, which 
were “installed to avoid enormous risks to the lives and limbs of others, 
not dominantly in response to the health risks to users invariably present 
in any case of drug use.”211 
Similarly, the school district in Vernonia cited a drug culture in its 
schools to support the argument for a need to drug test its students 
without a prior showing of individualized suspicion.212  It argued that 
there was substantial evidence of the drug culture among the students, 
and that the athletes were the leaders of that drug culture; as a result, it 
also argued that it needed to implement a drug testing policy to identify 
which students were using drugs.213  As a result, the Vernonia Court 
allowed the school district to have both sides of the argument—both a 
justification for the testing by having an identified problem and the 
burden of identifying the source of the problem.214  Such an allowance 
leaves students with no protection against suspicionless searches. 
                                                 
207 See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646 (1995). 
208 Compare Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646, with Earls, 536 U.S. 822.  The Court determined the 
invasion to be “negligible” in Vernonia, but the Earls Court, without defining the interest, 
gave even less weight to students’ privacy interests. 
209 Earls, 536 U.S. at 836.  The school district, in years prior to the policy’s adoption, had 
reported to the Federal Government that “types of drugs [other than alcohol and tobacco] 
including controlled dangerous substances, are present [in the schools] but have not 
identified themselves as major problems at this time.”  Id. at 849. 
210 Id. at 850. 
211 Id. 
212 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649. 
213 Id. at 649-50. 
214 Id.  In its argument for the implementation of suspicionless drug testing, the Court 
discussed the burden placed on teachers who would have to identify students who might 
have problems with drugs.  Id. at 648-49.  At the same time, the Court justified its decision 
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Despite the Court’s insistence that Von Raab, Skinner, and Vernonia 
were to be interpreted narrowly on the unique facts of each case, the 
Earls Court interpreted these decisions broadly in an effort to combat the 
national drug epidemic.215  As Justice O’Connor eloquently wrote in her 
dissenting opinion: 
It cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to 
our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis.  But 
we must also stay mindful that not all government 
responses to such times are hysterical overreactions; 
some crises are quite real, and when they are, they serve 
precisely as the compelling state interest that we have 
said may justify a measured intrusion on constitutional 
rights.  The only way for judges to mediate these 
conflicting impulses is to do what they should do 
anyway: stay close to the record in each case that 
appears before them, and make their judgments based 
on that alone.  Having reviewed the record here, I 
cannot avoid the conclusion that the District’s 
suspicionless policy of testing all student athletes 
sweeps too broadly, and too imprecisely, to be 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.216 
In the history of the Constitution, the Court has been wary of blanket 
suspicionless searches under the Fourth Amendment and the dissent 
was quick to note that threats such as the “war on drugs” should not 
have superseded the traditional requirement of individualized 
suspicion.217  In fact, prior to the cases discussed in Part II of this Note, 
suspicionless tests were determined to be per se unreasonable in light of 
the Fourth Amendment.218 
The Vernonia dissent mocked the majority opinion that 
individualized suspicion is only “usually required”.219 As Justice 
O’Connor wrote, “One searches [the Vernonia majoriy’s opinion] in vain 
for recognition that history and precedent establish that individualized 
                                                                                                             
by the fact that the school boards were within constitutional boundaries by implementing 
these programs based on observations made by teachers of a perceived drug problem in 
the school district.  Id. at 649-50. 
215 See supra Parts II.B-II.C. 
216 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 686 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.C.2. 
217 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
218 See supra Part II.C.2. 
219 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 676. 
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suspicion is ‘usually required’ under the Fourth Amendment (regardless 
of whether a warrant and probable cause are also required).”220 
B. A Message to Our Children:  You Are Guilty Until Proven Innocent 
While there is no doubt that the goals of such drug testing policies 
are well intended, such policies send the wrong message to the youth of 
America.221  Constitutional guarantees should sometimes be challenged 
the most when they are under the guise of working for the benefit of 
society.222   
Despite the benevolent intentions of the school districts, these drug 
tests send a message to children that they are guilty until proven 
innocent, turning the fundamental American tenet of presumed 
innocence on its head.223  Schoolchildren in America are educated at a 
young age about the freedoms, privileges, and liberties guaranteed by 
our government, yet are deprived of all of these when they are subjected 
to suspicionless drug tests in public schools.224  “[M]any schools, like 
many parents, prefer to trust their children unless given reason to do 
otherwise.”225 
                                                 
220 Id.  The Court recognized that the only exception would be in situations where a 
suspicion based search would be ineffectual, which it did not consider to be the case in 
Vernonia. 
221 Brief for the Respondent at 26, Vernonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (No. 94-590). 
222 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty 
when the Government’s purposes are beneficent.  Men born to 
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-
minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding. 
Id. 
223 Brief for Respondent at 17, supra note 221, at 17.  This is inconsistent with the Court’s 
view that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and 
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him 
for additional obligations.”  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (quoting Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)). 
224 Jackson, supra note 201, at 695.  Adolescents are taught about the values of our society 
in the home and at school, so it is important for the educators to respect the role they play 
in preparing students for the responsibilities and expectations of society.  Anthony G. 
Buzbee, Who Will Speak for the Teachers? Precedent Prevails in Vernonia School District v. 
Acton, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1229, 1230-31 (1996).  “The duty to prepare a child for ‘additional 
obligations,’ . . . must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious 
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”  Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233. 
225 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 682. 
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The Court in Chandler addressed the role of government as a leader 
by example, quoting prior case law, “Our Government is the potent, the 
omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by 
its example.”226  The government does not play a more important role in 
teaching by example than it does in the public school environment, 
where children are first introduced to the values of our government.227  
Constitutional rights should especially be protected in the school 
environment where we are teaching students the value of citizenship.228  
Otherwise we “strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”229 
Although the Court in both Vernonia and Earls relied heavily on the 
school’s role as a custodial and tutelary institution that acts in loco 
parentis,230 it failed to consider the effect of treating students like second-
class citizens and the message such treatment conveys to the students.231  
Additionally, though the Court has established that the state has a 
legitimate interest in maintaining safety in its school districts, subjecting 
students to suspicionless testing is neither the most efficient nor the most 
effective means of achieving such a goal.232 
C. Compulsory Education Equals Compulsory Drug Testing? 
The Court has already extended its special needs analysis to school 
districts wishing to drug test athletes and students involved in 
extracurricular activities, but it has not yet decided the constitutionality 
of a policy that applies to all students enrolled in public schools.233  
Despite compulsory education laws and the Court’s recognition of the 
importance of education in our society, the Court has been reticent in 
recognizing education as a fundamental right.234  While the Supreme 
Court has not included education as a fundamental right, and thus does 
not require strict scrutiny be used when examining state laws, most 
                                                 
226 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485)). 
227 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 657 (1943)). 
228 Id. 
229 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
230 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646. 
231 Jackson, supra note 201, at 695. 
232 See infra Part IV. 
233 See supra Part II.C. 
234 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). 
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states have concluded that education is a fundamental right under their 
respective state constitutions.235   
The Court, however, in its recognition of the importance of 
education in the United States, stated that “education provides the basic 
tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to 
the benefit of us all.”236  While such a right may not be enough to require 
strict scrutiny of state legislation and school board policies, it might 
outweigh the school’s need to impede on students’ rights to education 
when it is combined with the parents’ rights to raise their children and 
students’ rights to privacy.237 
In both the Vernonia and Earls decisions, the Court refers to 
governmental needs that apply to schoolchildren in general, but makes 
narrow holdings based on students’ participation in athletics or 
extracurricular activities.238  In contrast to the situations in Skinner and 
Von Raab, where employees of closely regulated industries were 
subjected to random drug testing, and had the option to seek another 
job, public school children would not have any other option if they chose 
to protect their bodily integrity by refusing to submit to suspicionless 
drug testing.239  
While there is no doubt that students benefit from the education they 
are provided, such education should not be deemed a privilege when 
examined in light of compulsory education laws.  It is an unnecessary 
invasion of a student’s right to privacy to be subjected to compulsory 
drug tests without a showing of an individualized suspicion or a 
compelling state need.240 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
While education may be another approach to combating a national 
drug problem, it is not the role of the federal government to control how 
school districts deal with their respective disciplinary issues.241  School 
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districts are permitted to make this decision at their discretion.242  This 
Part suggests that the Court should add a fourth factor to its balancing 
test:  parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their children.  The 
Court should also implement a strict scrutiny standard of review to 
apply to the governmental interest prong of the balancing test for 
suspicionless drug testing policies, which would require the school 
district to show a “compelling” interest that is narrowly tailored to 
achieve its stated goal.243 
A. The Proposed Balancing Test 
The revised balancing test would take into account:  (1) the nature of 
the privacy interest compromised by students who are subjected to such 
testing; (2) the character of the intrusion imposed by the policy; (3) the 
compelling governmental concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in 
meeting them; and (4) the parents’ fundamental Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process rights to control the upbringing of their children.  
1. A Proposed Fourth Prong to the Balancing Test:  Parents’ Right to 
Control the Upbringing of Their Children 
In both Vernonia and Earls, the claims challenging the drug testing 
programs in question were brought by both the students and their 
parents.244  Because the parents had concerns about the school district 
violating the privacy rights of their children, they did not sign the 
consent form allowing the searches.  While they were free to refuse 
signing the consent form, their children were denied the opportunity to 
participate in extracurricular activities.  At that point, a concerned 
parent’s only option was to file a lawsuit or allow his child to be 
deprived of the opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities.   
                                                                                                             
stated in 1755, “Those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”  Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: 
Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755).  The best way to combat the national drug abuse 
problem may be to use the money that is being channeled into drug testing programs to 
educate children on the dangers of drug abuse.  Such programs would inform children of 
the potential dangers of drug abuse without imposing an adversarial relationship between 
students and administrators.  Also, such a relationship sends schoolchildren the wrong 
message that they are guilty until proven innocent. 
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Pressure to comply with such testing would be even greater in 
school districts that impose drug testing on all students.  Parents would 
not have a choice in the matter and would have to consent to the testing 
or send the child to a private school.  Despite this concern, the Court’s 
current stance seems to open the door to such testing in public schools, 
which leaves parents with very little control over the upbringing of their 
children. 
While the parental interest in their children’s right of privacy is 
great, the Court does not even consider this interest in Vernonia or 
Earls.245  This should be another factor considered by the Court in its 
balancing test, especially when the claim is brought by both the student 
and the student’s parents.  The Court’s decisions regarding the parents’ 
rights to raise their children against the school’s interest in maintaining 
order have been mixed, but the plurality decision in Troxel v. Granville 
held that it was a fundamental right.246 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court combined the parents’ right to 
control the upbringing of their children with an enumerated First 
Amendment right to defeat the state law. 247  The Court may not have 
come to the same decision had it simply been a First Amendment 
challenge or a right of the parents to control the upbringing challenge, 
but by combining the two constitutional rights, the plaintiffs were able to 
defeat the state’s compulsory education laws.  This type of hybrid 
challenge should also be available to parents challenging a school 
district’s drug testing program. 
Moreover, the Court needs to be more consistent in its application of 
the parental right to raise children.  Giving such substantial weight to the 
parents’ right in Yoder and Troxel, then failing to mention that right in 
Vernonia or Earls, creates cloudy precedent for lower courts to follow.  
Such inconsistency supports the argument that the Court simply applies 
whatever test it deems necessary to reach the predetermined result of its 
choice.  But giving parents a waiver or an option to opt-out would be a 
sufficient solution.  Some parents may welcome the school’s assistance in 
monitoring their children, while others may choose to trust their children 
or handle such issues within the family. 
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2. Strict Scrutiny Application to the Governmental Concern Prong 
In dealing with the special needs doctrine, the Court has been 
inconsistent in what standard of review it applies to the governmental 
concern prong.248  The two decisions regarding suspicionless drug 
testing in schools have also been unclear as to what standard the Court 
will apply.249  This confusion is understandable considering the 
competing rights involved in such testing, but to establish a more 
concrete precedent, the Court must establish a standard of review for 
such cases. This Note proposes that such drug testing policies be 
subjected to strict scrutiny. 
Under strict scrutiny, the school testing policy would be 
presumptively invalid, but could be upheld in situations of 
individualized suspicion and in situations where the school district can 
establish a prevalent drug problem or individualized suspicion that 
would require a drug testing program.  These situations would give the 
school district a compelling reason to implement such a program. 
Strict scrutiny would be appropriate because of the several rights 
which are at issue in such testing.  A hybrid of both the students’ 
enumerated Fourth Amendment rights and the parents’ fundamental 
rights to control the upbringing of their children should be sufficient 
enough interests for the Court to trigger its strict scrutiny standard of 
review.  
There is no doubt about governmental concerns with drug use, but 
that does not justify the Court circumventing the language of the 
Constitution.  There is also a national concern regarding adult drug use, 
but that does not entitle police officers to search every citizen and use the 
national drug problem to justify the search.  The Court has always had a 
preference for individualized suspicion in its interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment and as a result, blanket policies such as these should not be 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.250 
An individualized suspicion or at least a demonstrated problem in 
the school district should be proven prior to implementing drug testing.  
Such offerings of proof would most likely be sufficient to establish a 
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“compelling” government interest.  The burden of proof should be on 
the school district to show that there was a drug problem in the district 
and it had exhausted its options in combating the problem prior to the 
implementation of suspicionless drug testing. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
With a little more Constitutional protection, well-behaved students 
like Guy Good may not have to be subjected to such governmental 
intrusion, and thus, would be more at ease in the school environment.  
He would not have to sit in nervous anticipation of the next time he will 
be called to have his privacy violated.  His parents would also be assured 
that their son was in the school’s custody without the threat of having 
his liberty compromised. 
Widespread drug use is undoubtedly a concern among school 
administrators across the country.  In addressing this concern, school 
districts have implemented policies that threaten students’ privacy rights 
and also instill the wrong message regarding what expectations all 
Americans should have of the protections of the Constitution.  The Court 
has manipulated and avoided the language of the Fourth Amendment to 
reach a result allowing for a diminished constitutional right of privacy 
for students.  This reach can be interpreted to extend to all students who 
are not only enrolled in school, but are required to attend school due to 
the state compulsory education laws. 
The Court addressed several factors and applied them to a balancing 
test, but made no consideration of parents’ fundamental right to control 
the upbringing of their children.  Student drug testing has been before 
the Court twice in the past eleven years, and the Court has broadened 
the scope of the power of school districts each time.  Opposite this 
broadening of power is the diminishing of our schoolchildren’s 
constitutional rights.  The Court should implement strict scrutiny and 
consider parents in its balancing test before we rob future generations of 
the constitutional privileges that define America. 
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